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1. Introduction 
 
 Income inequality between persons in the world as a whole can be 
conceptualized as composed of two elements. First there is inequality within 
nations or countries. Second, there is inequality between nations or countries, 
being defined as inequality between the average incomes of these different 
nations. Some inequality measures, such as the variance of log-income, or the 
generalized entropy family of inequality measures, can be formally 
decomposed into these two components such that they add up to total 
inequality. In a purely accounting sense, therefore, inequality within nations 
and inequality between nations both contribute to global inequality and are 
thus appropriate policy targets. Even when such a precise formal accounting 
decomposition cannot be accomplished for income, or even when the 
discourse on inequality transcends income and touches on broader dimensions 
such as health and education, the notion of equity between and within nations 
serves well as a framework for underlying concerns and for organizing 
discussion and debate. 
 
 Inequality within nations is ordinarily thought to be within the purview 
of the policymakers and the social and political processes of that country. In a 
globalizing world, however, it cannot be insulated from global forces and 
trends, and from policies adopted by other countries or the international 
community at large. Sometimes, it cannot even be insulated from the social 
and political processes in other countries, especially neighboring countries.  
Leaving aside these global influences, whose effects are much discussed, there 
is of course considerable debate about equity and inequity within a country, its 
impact on growth and on the fabric of society, and on what policies can best 
be deployed to reduce inequity if that is an ethical goal, or to manage its 
consequences for growth and development even if equity per se is not an 
ethical concern. For example, among the fundamental issues to be addressed 
is the conceptual, empirical and policy difference between reducing inequality 
of ex post outcomes and inequality of ex ante opportunity. 
 
 Difficult as the questions of equity within nations tend to be, inequality 
between nations is an altogether more difficult topic. The difficulties are 
partly philosophical, arising from a long standing debate on what exactly 
constitutes a moral community of concern. Does this moral community move 
outwards from the family, in concentric circles of diminishing concern as it 
reaches extended family, immediate neighborhood, region, nation and the 
world? Or do our deep moral imperatives lead us to a flatter world in the sense 
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of a moral community, so that the only morally defensible objective is to 
reduce inequity between citizens of the world, no matter which nations they 
happen to be citizens of? At the same time, the nature of policy instruments 
available at the global level is less certain and less clear, both in the technical 
sense of the operation of these global instruments,  and because in any case 
these instruments exist only as the result of agreements between sovereign 
nation states. One of the most difficult of these global questions, and one on 
which the nation state holds greatest sway, is that of free migration of labor 
across national borders. 
 
 This volume brings together a significant new collection of papers by 
leading economists who address a range of challenging questions on equity 
within and between nations, in the context of a globalizing world. Most of the 
papers were presented at workshops organized by the Commission on Growth 
and Development (henceforth, the Growth Commission), in the run up to the 
publication of the Growth Report.1
                                                 
1 Commission on Growth and Development (2008), chaired by A. Michael Spence, 
 In its report, the Commission emphasized 
the importance of equity within nations: 
 
 “The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot 
succeed without a commitment to equality of opportunity, giving everyone a 
fair chance to enjoy the fruits of growth. But equal opportunities are no 
guarantee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in the early stages of growth, there is a 
natural tendency for income gaps to widen. Governments should seek to 
contain this inequality, the Commission believes, at the bottom and top ends 
of the income spectrum. Otherwise, the economy’s progress may be 
jeopardized by divisive politics, protest and even violent ethnic conflict. 
Again, if the ethical case does not persuade, the pragmatic one should.” (p.7) 
 
It also called for equity between nations, highlighting the responsibilities of 
advanced countries, including on trade: 
 
 “Developing countries cannot grow without the support of the advanced 
economies. In particular, they need access to the open global trading system. 
They may also need some latitude to promote their exports, until their 
economies have matured and their competitive position has improved.” 
 
http://www.growthcommission.org/index.php. For the Growth report, see 
http://www.growthcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=169  
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In this introduction and overview we highlight what we see as the key 
issues on equity that emerge for analysts and policy makers from the papers in 
this volume, and from the literature more generally. Section 2 takes up the 
perspective of equity within nations, while Section 3 focuses on equity in the 
global context. Section 4 draws together the discussion of the previous two 
sections into a policy focused discussion of what can and should be done to 
address equity within and between nations. 
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2. Within Country Poverty and Inequality 
 
 What is the actual experience of the evolution of incomes and other 
dimensions of well being in developing countries over the past two decades? 
In their paper, Francois Bourguignon et. al. (Chapter 2) provide a 
comprehensive answer to this question, focusing on the dimensions captured 
in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The specific indicators 
proposed for tracking the MDGs include income poverty, malnutrition, school 
enrollment rates for boys and girls, infant mortality rates, maternal mortality 
rates, etc.  Despite the data difficulties, and these are considerable, they 
summarize the analysis of the World Bank and the United Nations as follows: 
 
“i) Global progress is surprisingly good, especially for the poverty and 
the gender parity goals; less so for the child mortality and maternal 
mortality goal. As is widely acknowledged, however, the progress on 
global poverty is very much driven by overachievers in East and South 
Asia, including China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh.  
ii) There are clear regional patterns in MDG progress which depend on 
initial conditions and recent growth performances. If Asian countries 
are over-achievers in the income poverty goal, they perform relatively 
worse in health and, in the case of India, in education and gender 
equity. Conversely, Latin America and the Middle East are relative 
underachievers in the poverty goal, but relative overachievers in 
health, education and gender equity. Finally, Sub-Saharan African 
countries lag much behind other regions. 
iii) Most countries in all regions are off-track on most MDGs (or data is 
missing to assess progress), including even some of those countries 
which have experienced very good growth performance. 
iv) MDG achievements are much lower in ‘fragile’ states. One of the 
reasons why Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind on the MDGs is the 
relatively large proportion of so-called ‘fragile states’ in that region. 
The definition of fragile countries used here is that established by the 
World Bank.2
                                                 
2 The countries referred to as ‘fragile’ are low-income countries that score below a certain cut-off in 
the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment rating (CPIA). These ratings reflect 
assessments made by Bank staff members in a range of policy and institutional areas, but, in 
practice, fragility is most often linked to present or past conflicts in the national territory or in 
neighboring states. 
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v) In most regions, including those that have been successful on the 
poverty goal, progress on reducing childhood under-nutrition is 
extremely slow. 
vi) The poorest regions, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, are the two 
regions still seriously off-track for primary completion rates and for 
child mortality.  
vii) Progress has been good on gender equity in primary and secondary 
enrolments in all regions. Yet Sub-Saharan Africa and other fragile 
states still lag seriously behind. Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are unlikely to meet this goal.” 
 
 As Bourguignon et. al. note, the overall pattern thus seems to be one of 
“a half full and half empty glass.” But further analysis of the data reveals two 
important conclusions that are relevant for policy. First, they find that even 
within regions there is considerable country heterogeneity in country 
performance on the MDGs. Some of these differences can be accounted for by 
structural factors such as geographic location or whether a country is a 
“fragile state”, but even allowing for these there is significant variation. This 
surely emphasizes another of the themes of The Growth Report, that country 
specificity and context matters, and a uniform policy prescription across 
countries is inappropriate.  
 
 Second, although there is strong correlation between growth in income 
per capita and changes in income measures of poverty, for non-income 
MDG’s Bourguignon et. al, conclude that: 
 
 “The correlation between GDP per capita growth and [improvements 
in] non-income MDGs is practically zero, as illustrated in Figure 5 for Sub-
Saharan countries. This serves to confirm the lack of a relationship between 
those indicators and poverty reduction. As it would be hard to believe that 
information on non-income MDGs is so badly affected by measurement error 
that it is pure noise, this lack of a relationship reflects some relative 
independence among policy instruments governing progress in the various 
MDGs. Furthermore, it highlights substantive differences in country policies 
and circumstances that may affect the relationship between these policies. 
This is an interesting finding which suggests that economic growth is not 
sufficient per se to generate progress in non-income MDGs. Sectoral policies 
and other factors or circumstances presumably matter as much as growth.” 
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Thus, as the Growth Report acknowledges and emphasizes, growth is not an 
end in itself; it is a necessary but not sufficient for development in the broader 
sense. 
 
 Even for income poverty, where the correlation with economic growth 
is strong, there are still significant variations around the average relationship. 
Specifically different countries seem to translate economic growth into 
reduction in income poverty at different rates—the “growth elasticity of 
poverty reduction” varies considerably. In countries such as China, Honduras, 
Ghana, Uganda and Cambodia, this effectiveness appears to be quite low. As 
reviewed by Ravi Kanbur (Chapter 3), a growing theoretical and empirical 
literature locates this ineffectiveness in high and rising inequality, which 
dissipates the poverty reduction benefits of economic growth.  
 
In his paper, Kanbur highlights the disconnect between falling income 
poverty indices in fast growth economies on the one hand, and growing 
distributional concerns among the civil societies and polities of these very 
same countries. What explains this disconnect? He argues that official poverty 
statistics by their very nature will tend to understate true poverty and overstate 
improvement in poverty. One important reason is that they ignore intra-
household inequality, because official surveys collect data on consumption 
only at the household level. Thus, by ignoring a key dimension of inequity in 
society, namely gender inequity within the household, official statistics bias 
the national representation of the level and trends in poverty. They paint a 
rosier picture than warranted, thereby misleading the policy debate. 
 
Kanbur also argues that, quite independently of the dissipating effect of 
high and rising inequality on the growth-poverty reduction relationship, higher 
inequality in and of itself creates tensions in society which are reflected in the 
concerns of the polity. This is particularly true when the inequity is across 
salient socio-political groupings such as regions, religions or ethnicities. The 
reason why such inequities and the tensions they cause can hold back 
investment and growth is fairly clear. However, in his paper Abhijit Banerjee 
(Chapter 4) develops an analysis that shows a causal link between inequity 
pure and simple, even when it does not have ethnic or other group dimensions, 
and investment efficiency and growth. He develops a canonical model in 
which there is no correlation between entrepreneurial talent and wealth but, 
because of fixed costs of investment and because of imperfect credit markets, 
those with more wealth are better able to invest in their own projects. As a 
result, “some less talented rich people are able to bid the capital away from 
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some poorer but more gifted entrepreneurs (or, equivalently, the rich father of 
a mediocre student can bid away a seat in a good college from the poor father 
of the next would-be genius).” And the problem is not just that the poor are 
too poor to finance the fixed costs of investment; it is also that the rich can bid 
away capital because of their better ability to offer collateral. In this sense, 
“there is too much capital in the hands of the rich.” Banerjee reviews the 
empirical evidence on credit constraints, which supports the assumptions in 
his model, and concludes that, “there is reason to try redistribute investible 
resources, not only towards the poor, but also towards specific groups of the 
non-poor, including many established but smaller entrepreneurs.” 
 
 Further arguments and evidence for the importance of equity for the 
promotion of efficiency and economic growth is presented in the paper by 
Andrew Morrison, Dhushyanth Raju and Nistha Sinha (Chapter 5,). They start 
by recognizing that the evidence that economic growth, on average and over a 
long period of time, is associated with greater gender equity is quite strong. 
This is all the more an argument for promoting economic growth, as argued in 
The Growth Report. However, recalling the results of Bourguignon et. al in 
Chapter 2, there is significant variation around such relationships, and there is 
plenty of room for purposive interventions to promote gender equity, to ensure 
that the fruits of growth are indeed being shared equitably. Moreover, such 
direct promotion of gender equity can by itself act as a spur to efficiency and 
economic growth, and this is the burden of argument in the paper by 
Morrison, Raju and Sinha in Chapter 5. The conduct a thorough review of the 
literature, and identify not only key findings but also areas for further research 
where knowledge is lacking. By and large they find that gender equity is 
supportive of efficiency and growth, but highlight the following areas where 
more research is needed: (i) documenting gender disparities, (ii) more 
rigorous evidence on the gender-differentiated effects of increased access by 
the poor  to economic resources and opportunities, and  (iii) “more rigorous 
evidence on whether and how improving the socioeconomic position of 
mothers benefits children’s welfare more than improving the same position of 
fathers, and whether improving gender equality, such as by reducing barriers 
to increasing human capital accumulation and accessing markets, translate 
into gains into national economic growth and development.” 
 
 The Growth Report recognizes the distinction between equality and 
equality of opportunity, on which there has been much debate in the literature. 
According to the Growth Commission, equality refers to outcomes or results, 
equality of opportunity refers to starting points: 
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 “People care about both kinds of equality. But they understand that 
markets do not produce equal outcomes. They will tolerate this inequality, 
provided governments take steps to contain it….Inequality of opportunity, on 
the other hand, does not involve trade-offs and can be toxic, This is especially 
so if the opportunities are systematically denied to a group due to its ethnicity, 
religion, caste or gender…How can governments safeguard equality of 
opportunity and contain inequality of outcomes? The latter goal is served by 
redistribution, over and above the informal sharing arrangements that often 
prevail in extended families and tight-knit communities. Equality of 
opportunity is best served by providing universal access to public services like 
health and education, and by meritocratic systems in government and the 
private sector.” (p 62) 
 
 A somewhat different perspective is presented in Kanbur (Chapter 3) 
who argues, in reacting to a literature that tries to specific and measure 
equality of opportunity, that it may be difficult in practice to distinguish 
between equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes. This is especially 
the case if the latter is seen as differing from the first because of individual 
“effort” or “tastes” since, for example, the effort or tastes of parents translate 
into the starting points (“circumstances”) of their children. Equalizing starting 
points for children may then involve , at least to some extent, equalizing 
outcomes between their parents—so the clean distinction breaks down in 
concept as well as in practice. Nevertheless, it remains true that differences in 
achievements across broad groups differentiated by gender, ethnicity, caste, 
religion have moral significance beyond the fact that they contribute to 
inequality between persons. If we believe that there is no inherent difference 
in talent across these groups, then differences in wealth, income, education etc 
as a result of belonging to these groups per se is inefficient and ethically 
objectionable. 
 
 The paper by Francisco Ferreira and Jérémie Gignoux (Chapter 6) 
presents a detailed empirical analysis of inequality of opportunity, by applying 
the concept and measurement to the case of Turkey. Using data from the 
Demographic and  Health Survey (DHS), that paper examines variation in the 
quantity and quality of education. It is shown that enrollment rates (correcting 
for age) differ on average across gender, across regions and across family 
backgrounds. Variation in test scores are also affected by these factors, and 
other indicators of a child’s “circumstances” such as parental education and 
father’s occupation. An interesting difference, however, is that while gender 
determines differences in enrollemtn and retention (lower for girls), 
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conditional on begining school it is is not an importnat factor explaining test 
scores. As Fereira and Gignoux conclude, “The policy lesson for those 
concerned with girls’ education in Turkey seems to be that the big priority is 
really to get - and keep – them in school. Once there, they seem to do well 
enough.” The analysis by Ferreira and Gignoux illustrates how careful 
empirical work on micro data can shed light not only on “big picture” 
conceptual issues like “equality of opportunity”, but it can also provide 
pointers to very specific policy interventions to achieve equity in key 
dimensions. 
 
 Part of the story of the literature on equity within nations is the level of 
aggregation at which the discourse proceeds, or should proceed. Thus 
Bourguignon et. al. (Chapter 2), after giving a detailed cross-country account 
of how well being has evolved, do emphasize that variations within countries 
are also important. The previous chapters have focused on the lowest part of 
the income distribution (poverty), and also on achievements on broad 
groupings within countries such as gender, ethnicity, etc. However, a group of 
particular interest, in all developing countries but particularly in fast growing 
ones, is the “middle class.” This grouping is important because of its central 
role (literally and figuratively) in the generation of the income distribution, 
and in determining tax and transfer policies that affect the wellbeing of the 
poor. Thus, for example, Kanbur (Chapter 3) argues for transfer policies that 
cushion the poor against shocks and vulnerabilities. But such policies cannot 
be introduced without the support of middle income groups—the imperative 
of fine targeting for efficiency of the transfer has to be traded off against some 
leakages to middle income groups to build support for the programs in the 
first place. 
 
 The paper by Nancy Birdsall (Chapter 7) is motivated by the potential 
political power (PPP, as she calls it) of the middle class. But a prior question 
is the empirical one of how the middle class is to be defined, how big it is, and 
what its characteristics are. The Birdsall paper addresses these questions in 
turn. She defines this middle class as those at consumption/income above $10 
a day in 2005, and at or below the 95th percentile of the distribution of their 
country. She discusses and defends this mixture of absolute and relative 
criteria in the definition, as opposed to alternatives in the literature like just 
the middle three quintiles. On the $10 line: “I propose an absolute minimum 
on the grounds that in the relatively open economies of most developing 
countries today, with economic security to some extent vulnerable to external 
as well as internal economic and political shocks (including weather, financial 
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crises and so on -- consider the food and fuel price spikes in 2008), as well as 
some consumption standards set at the global level (a car for example if not 
everywhere a Lexus), some absolute minimum makes sense.” On the 95th 
percentile: “The relative maximum, which obviously varies across countries, 
can be thought of as excluding that portion of the population within a country 
whose income is most likely to be from inherited wealth, or based on prior or 
current economic rents associated with monopoly or other privileges, and thus 
less associated with productive and primarily labor activity than for the non-
rich.” 
 
 One can clearly debate the specifics of the Birdsall definition, and she 
herself recognizes criticisms and addresses them. What is interesting and 
important, however, is that some such definition gives us an empirical basis 
on which to delve deeper into specific part of the income distribution. She 
goes on to provide an account of the size and composition of the middle class 
across countries. In light of this exploration she concludes that “the real 
tradeoff in policy design is far better thought of in developing countries as a 
tradeoff between the rich and the rest rather than, as has been the mindset in 
the international community for several decades, the absolute poor and the 
rest.” Such a conclusion certainly influences the perspective and the 
framework from which the issue of equity within nations is approached. 
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3. Equity in the Global Context 
 
 The paper by Ann Harrison and Margaret McMillan (Chapter 8) marks 
a transition in this volume between a focus on a nation or a country to looking 
beyond that country at the world at large. It is recognized that opportunities 
for international trade and especially knowledge transfer have been a central 
factor in explaining growth performance of developing countries.  There is 
relatively little debate about that.  Sustained high growth in isolation is very 
unlikely and there are no counter examples.  But there is considerable debate 
on what policies best serve the interest of taking advantage of these 
opportunities to promote growth.  A prime example of the latter are industrial 
policies for export promotion and structural diversification of the economy. 
The debates within the Growth Commission, discussed in the Growth Report, 
are indicative of the different views and continuing debate in this area: 
 
 “Some skeptics might concede that markets do not always work, but 
they argue that industrial policies don’t either…The risk of failure or 
subversion is too great…But there also risk to doing nothing….If an economy 
is failing to diversify its exports and failing to generate productive jobs in new 
industries, governments do look for ways to jump-start the process, and they 
should.” (p. 49) 
 
While the debate on the exact nature of outward orientation and its impact on 
growth will no doubt go on, the focus of the Harrison and McMillan paper is 
the impact of this outward orientation on poverty. Rather like the Chapter on 
Gender, this chapter summarizes its findings but also lays out an agenda for 
further research. 
 
 Does globalization reduce poverty? Harrison and McMillan summarize 
their findings as follows. First, “The poor in countries with an abundance of 
unskilled labor do not always gain from trade reform”. This may seem 
surprising given the basic teaching of trade theory, especially around the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it would appear that the conditions of this 
theorem are not met in practice (it is not the case that all countries, produce all 
goods, labor is immobile, and so on). Second, “The poor are more likely to 
share in the gains from globalization when there are complementary policies 
in place.” Third, “Export growth and incoming foreign investment can reduce 
poverty. In the countries we study, poverty has fallen in regions where exports 
or foreign investment is growing.” Fourth, “Financial crises are costly to the 
poor.” This is a uniform finding in the literature and, although the evidence 
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base of the Harrison and McMillan paper predates the current crisis, this 
finding has relevance for policy responses to the current downturn as well. 
Fifth, “Globalization produces both winners and losers among the poor.” The 
central point is that the poor are heterogeneous in terms of their characteristics 
and in terms of their engagement with the economy. Thus policies like broad 
tariff reduction are bound to have differential impacts on the poor. Even when 
overall poverty falls, it is possible that a significant number of the poor are 
impoverished as a result, at least in the short term. Whether this happens or 
not is of course empirical question, but Kanbur (Chapter 3) argues that this 
could be one of the reasons behind the disconnect between good official 
poverty figures and ground level discontent, as expressed by those poor who 
have been made poorer, even though the majority of the poor have benefited. 
 
 Harrison and McMillan have a final conclusion: “Different measures of 
globalization are associated with different poverty outcomes. How 
globalization is measured determines whether globalization is good for the 
poor.” Their paper of course focuses on openness to trade and capital flows. 
On this basis there has indeed been considerable globalization of the world 
economy over the past decades. But the one measure on which globalization is 
not very pronounced is on labor flows. The final three papers in this volume 
are all focused on the question of international migration and its impact, or the 
impact of the lack on international migration, on equity within and between 
nations. The central empirical question in these papers is the extent to which 
labor of the same type earns different returns in different countries, how much 
migration this leads to, the impact of this migration in turn on these wage 
differentials. The implicit or explicit moral challenge in these papers is to the 
national restrictions on migration in the face of large and persistent wage 
differentials that exacerbate inequity between nations. 
 
The paper by Mark Rosenzweig (Chapter 9) provides an analysis of the 
nature of global wage differentials using three newly available data sets:  New 
Immigrant Survey Pilot, Occupational Wages Around the World, and the New 
Immigrant Survey. A major finding is that “The data reject the model 
underlying the Mincer wage specification, which assumes perfect capital and 
labor markets and no barriers to schooling acquisition (and no permanent 
differences in lifetime earnings), suggesting that a framework incorporating 
the determinants of the supply and pricing of skills is better suited to 
accounting for wage inequality.” Focusing then on just supply and pricing of 
skills, the paper finds that it is the latter which is the major influence on 
wages, and draws the following sharp conclusion: “That most of global 
 14 
inequality in incomes is due to inter-country differences in the prices of skills 
suggests that greater equalization of schooling levels arising from domestic 
schooling policies will have only marginal effects on global inequality, that 
domestic development policies in poor countries should focus on the 
underlying reasons skill are less valued, and that labor is poorly distributed 
across countries based on global efficiency criteria, given the structure of skill 
prices.” Perhaps not surprisingly, the paper also finds that skill price 
differential is a determinant of migration flows to the US. 
 
While the paper by Rosenzweig is an analysis of a specific recently 
available data, the paper by Gordon Hanson (Chapter 9) is an overview of the 
general literature on international migration and development, and thus has a 
broader scope in terms of questions asked and studies consulted. He provides 
a summary of the key findings of this literature as follows:  
 
“1. Bilateral migration flows are negatively affected by migration costs, 
as captured by geographic or linguistic distance between countries, the 
absence of migration networks, or the stringency of border enforcement 
against illegal entry….2. Emigration rates are highest for developing countries 
at middle income levels and with higher population densities….3. In most 
developing countries, it is the more educated who have the highest likelihood 
of emigrating….4. Emigrants sort themselves across destinations according to 
income-earning possibilities, with the countries that have the highest incomes 
for skilled labor attracting the most educated mix of immigrants….5. 
Empirically, the impact of opportunities for skilled emigration on the pattern 
and amount of investment in human capital in a country is unknown….6. 
There is some evidence that emigration puts upward pressure on wages in 
sending countries….7. Migrant remittances tend to positively correlated with 
household consumption and investments in education and entrepreneurial 
activities in sending countries.” 
 Whether one takes the specific study of Rosenzweig, or general survey 
of Hanson, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that freer movement of labor 
would certainly enhance global efficiency. It would improve equity between 
nations for sure, and although its impact on equity within nations is 
ambiguous, there are positive forces in this direction as well (for example, in 
the finding that emigration leads to upwards pressures on wages). It is this 
huge anomaly in the globalization discourse that motivates, and enrages, Lant 
Pricthett in his paper (Chapter 11), the final paper in the volume. 
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For Pritchett globalization as currently envisaged is a sham without 
freer movement of labor. On this score, if anything there has been a retreat 
since the number of sovereign nations has increased in the last few decades. 
These sovereigns present a “cliff at the border”, most important for labor 
movement. He presents considerable evidence of such cliffs, and argues that 
the world is not all flat—far from it. He labels the world as we now have it 
Proliferation of Sovereigns combined with Everything but Labor 
Liberalization (POSEBLL): “…. POSEBLL has led, as expected, to the 
equalization of prices of goods, equalization of the risk adjusted cost of 
capital.  But, perhaps unexpectedly, it has also led to very uneven progress in 
the newly proliferated sovereigns and this, combined with binding quantitative 
restrictions on the movement of labor, has also led to massive gaps in the 
wages of equivalent labor around the world and sustained divergence in the 
per capita incomes across nation-states.”   
 
Pritchett’s main thrust goes beyond the empirical establishment of these 
distortions, to an examination of their implication for equity. In doing so he 
takes on what he calls the “Nation-State-ization” of equity: “The question is, 
how does the massive differential treatment of people that are alike in every 
respect except for their affiliation with a particular nation-state, an essentially 
arbitrary condition of birth, square with any theory of justice?”  His discussion 
relates very much to our earlier discussion of equality of opportunity. If 
gender differences and ethnic differences cannot morally be the basis for 
unequal outcomes for people alike in talent, why should nation of birth have 
moral salience in evaluating equality of treatment? 
 
“’Because you are a girl’ is no longer considered a socially appropriate 
rationale for differential treatment….On the other hand, people who are 
exactly identical in every conceivable and observable respect can be treated in 
ways that cause their well-being to differ by orders of magnitude—for 
instance denied access to a more productive job--with no apparent violation of 
justice if those otherwise identical individuals happen to be citizens of 
different countries.” 
 
Pritchett’s discourse critiques many, including Rawls, supposed guide to our 
egalitarian instincts, for circumscribing his moral community to that of the 
nation state and thereby avoiding the problem altogether. 
 
 While Pritchett’s critique is powerful and appeals to moral intuition at 
one level, a truly global social welfare function, where citizenship did not 
 16 
matter, has its own jarring consequences. This can be illustrated with 
reference to MDG discussion from Bourguignon et. al (Chapter 2). As they 
show, globally there has been good progress on income poverty. So much so, 
in fact, that (before the current global financial crisis) the world was well on 
the way to meeting the MDG of halving the incidence of poverty between 
1990 and 2015. However, as also pointed out and highlighted by Bourguignon 
et. al. this performance is almost entirely explained by India, China and other 
large Asian countries because (i) they have had sharp falls in poverty and (ii) 
they account for the bulk of the population of developing countries. Sub-
Saharan Africa, on the other hand, has seen increase in poverty. If we took a 
truly global perspective a la Pritchett, we would presumably be indifferent as 
between an Indian or an African being lifted from poverty. But would this also 
allow us to “cancel out” the increase in African poverty with an equivalent fall 
in Asian poverty? The issue presents itself equally within a nation state as 
well, and we have already alluded to it. As highlighted in Kanbur (Chapter 3), 
quite often a fall in national poverty has been accompanied by a rise in the 
poverty of significant numbers, quite often in groups identified regionally. 
The impoverishment of an ethnic group, perhaps by the very same policies 
that have bettered poverty nationally, raises questions beyond the pragmatic 
ones of likely consequences for social peace. It jars morally as well. The 
nation state as the moral community does not seem to be an adequate 
response. In the same way, the world being a moral community that dominates 
other groupings may not be an adequate response to many distributional 
dilemmas. A balance will have to be struck in our ethical conceptualizations 
of equity within and between nations, just as a balance will have to be struck 
between national and global policy instruments in addressing inequity in its 
many dimensions. 
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4. Policy Conclusions 
 
We have not of course been able to cover the full range of issues that 
arise in a discussion of equity in a globalizing world. We have focused on 
topics covered by the papers in this volume and have not addressed many 
important questions, such as the role of development assistance as a response 
to inequity between nations, and as an instrument for reducing poverty and 
inequality within nations. We have also not discussed the role of global public 
goods (and global public bads) in equity within and between nations. 
 
Nevertheless the analysis and evidence presented in the papers here 
provides a useful framework for setting policy priorities.  In any country, and 
especially in developing countries, and also in the international arena, 
priorities have to be set and simply doing everything that sounds meritorious, 
even if one is sure about the desired direction, is not feasible.  Resources, 
physical, financial, human and political are not infinite. 
 
If one begins with what people care about, the papers make clear the list 
is not confined to income or material well-being in the narrow sense.  It 
includes health, education, productive employment opportunity, freedom of 
expression, a voice in governance and shaping the collective destiny, respect 
and more.  With respect to any of these fundamental aspects of life, there are 
those who are disadvantaged.  And the outcomes in the various dimensions 
are not perfectly or even very highly correlated within and across countries 
and regions.  It is a multidimensional policy challenge, domestically and 
internationally. 
 
The papers also make clear that ex ante (opportunity) and ex post 
(outcomes) equity issues deserve a high priority in policy setting for a number 
of reasons.  One reason is moral.  People may make choices that lead to 
differing levels of income.  But people do not choose to be very poor or to 
have limited access to basic services.  They end up in disadvantaged positions 
because of constraints of a variety of kinds, including intertemporal ones.   
 
A second reason has to do with preferences.  People generally care about 
equity for both moral and pragmatic reasons.  That gets translated in to 
political and social choices and implemented by policy.  The political 
challenge is to avoid the zero sum game version of this, in which one person’s 
gain is another loss.  Hence the importance of creating and choosing policies 
that deal with equity that also promote (or do not impede) growth and 
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expanding opportunity of an inclusive kind.   It has to be thought of as an 
inter-temporal challenge and not simply a static redistributional one.  It would 
be wrong to pretend that this is an easy challenge or that given the current 
state or our knowledge, the roadmap is well understood and agreed on. 
 
The third and related reason has to do with the sustainability of the 
growth and development process.  Persistent inequality in its various 
dimensions leads to political and social instability, or very harsh repression.  
In either case, the chances of growth and intergenerational improvement and 
poverty reduction decline precipitously.   
 
The case is very strong that there is considerable potential for 
productive economic activity, growth and employment among poor 
populations, potential that is untapped because structural barriers that produce 
lack of access to a variety of services that would serve as crucial inputs.  
Policies directed at the removal of these barriers and more generally at 
ensuring access to a broad array of basic services, security, financial, 
educational and other are likely to have a first order positive impact on growth 
and intertemporal poverty reduction. 
 
The middle class is important.  It gets bigger in a successfully growing 
and developing country.  It is increasingly politically important.  And many of 
its members or their parents used to be poor.  What does this mean?  As 
Birdsall and others argue, it means that paying attention to equity in growth 
and development policy terms cannot mean an exclusive focus on the poor.  
To do so produces a growing gap between the policy priorities and focus on 
the one hand and the status and aspirations of the majority of the people on the 
other.  So once again there is a political and policy balancing act combining a 
special concern for the poor and disadvantaged and a focus on policies that 
broadly improve the circumstances of the majority of the citizens.   
 
Some forms of inequality, deprivation, or deficit have particularly long 
lived effects.  The papers highlight these.  Nutrition, access to basic quality 
education, chronic and debilitating diseases would be among them.  Policies 
that address these issues should be a continuing priority.  They deal with 
equity issues and have the potential to have enormously high social and 
economic returns. 
 
The international dimensions of equity are morally and conceptually 
complex.  The absence of labor mobility clearly has a profound effect on 
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outcomes in terms of efficiency and distribution.  The growing volume of 
trade in services involving transactions and the processing of information is 
modifying the impact of this constraint.  Put another way, the tradable sector 
is becoming larger in the service area.   
 
In any market system, two parallel processes are at work.  People move 
to jobs and jobs move to human resources or people.  One can think of this as 
occurring in the tradable sector, whether international or domestic.  In the 
non-tradable sector, the only safety valve, since the jobs cannot move toward 
underemployed human resources, the people have to move.  And that is what 
is constrained in the global economy. 
 
The papers make clear that the international differences in incomes are 
not attributable to simple differences in skills.  They have more to do with the 
complementary assets that are in place.3
                                                 
3 There is ample evidence for this.  Well trained professionals in many fields who move from a developing 
country to an advanced country find their incomes rise reflecting a jump in productivity associated with the 
change in productivity enhancing complementary assets. 
  Both tangible and intangible assets 
take time to create.  The full transition from relatively poor to advanced 
country income levels even at sustained high growth rates takes more than 
half a century and at lower growth rates, much longer than that.  Hence these 
differentials, not a function of narrowly defined human capital differences, 
will be persistent.   
 
It is worth noting that within countries, labor mobility in the relevant 
economic sense is often not perfect.  There are linguistic issues, constraints on 
mobility created by infrastructure and there are institutions and legal 
structures that protect subsets of the labor force from competition from other 
segments.  Removal of these barriers is not easy.  Their removal generally will 
not benefit everyone.  The distributional issues come to the foreground in the 
political process. 
 
The same considerations appear in the international arena.  International 
policies that increase labor mobility have a high payoff in terms of efficiency 
and equity.  But they have distributional consequences just as does the 
expansion of the tradable sector.  Not everyone gains at least in the short run.  
It therefore meets resistance and in the case of immigration and emigration, 
the resistance can be very substantial. 
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A full scale attempt to change the landscape with respect to labor 
mobility and immigration is unlikely to be successful.  One way to reduce the 
distributional resistance to labor mobility in the international dimension is to 
focus on opening channels from surplus labor environments to labor shortage 
markets.  The papers suggest that this process works in practice, a kind of 
sorting process where immigration constraints are relaxed in response to a 
perceived need.  But the process is far from perfect.  There is potential for 
exploitation and abuse that invites the setting of international standards and 
the proper supervision of transnational labor flows. 
 
The research in the past 15 years has dramatically increased our 
understanding of inequality, its quantitative dimensions and its causes.  Major 
progress has been made in thinking about policies that deal effectively with 
equity.  The papers in this volume bring together much of that thinking and 
progress in a highly accessible form.  Our hope is that they will provide a 
useful framework to political and policy leaders as they wrestle with these 
important and challenging issues. 
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